Oltenia CCS Demo Project- Preliminary Technical Risk Assessment  by Anghel, Sorin
 Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  4677 – 4683 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
1876-6102 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of GHGT-12
doi: 10.1016/j.egypro.2014.11.501 
GHGT-12 
Oltenia CCS Demo Project- Preliminary technical risk assessment 
 
Sorin Anghel1 
 
1National Institute of Marine Geology and Geoecology  Str. Dimitrie Onciul, Nr. 23-25, RO-024053, Bucharest, Romania, 
soanghel@geoecomar.ro 
 
 
Abstract 
Hazards have been referenced by the functional element to which they are associated: Reservoir, Caprock, Faults, 
CO2, Overburden, Underburden, and Wells.They have been classified according to the detectable undesired event 
that they could potentially lead to, in the context of CO2 injection in the subsurface. When a hazard can lead to 
several events, it has been repeated in the relevant sections of the table. A high level review of the potential 
consequences of each undesired event is provided in the column “Consequences”. It is understood that the 
consequences of the same event could be different, depending on the hazard which is causing this event. 
Nonetheless, as this is a preliminary exercise this fact has not been formally represented in the table.Finally, a high 
level screening of the potential prevention measures that could be put in place at different phases of the project 
(appraisal, construction, injection/monitoring) as well as mitigation measures are provided in the last column of the 
table.This list is not meant to be exhaustive but its objective is rather to highlight the most important technical risks 
associated to the project and plan accordingly for the next phases (in particular the appraisal). As mentioned before, 
due to the early stage of the project, a quantitative assessment of the risks has not been performed as part of this 
task. However, a preliminary analysis of the criticity of the risks associated with the identified hazards was 
conducted with the objective to highlight what were felt as the major concerns concerning the two candidate sites at 
this stage of the project.Again, the data currently available not allowing us to discriminate meaningfully between the 
two zones, this has been kept as a common exercise. At this early stage of the project, only a preliminary risk 
assessment is possible, with the following consequences: no risk scenario has been explicitly described, but only 
individual hazards (which will form the “building pieces” of risk scenarios); no quantitative evaluation of severity 
and likelihood has been made; each of the two candidate zones has specific risk factors. However, given the current 
level of understanding, it has been decided that a meaningful discrimination between the two zones was not yet 
possible and therefore, the exercise has been kept as common for both zone 1 and  
zone 5. Hazards and undesired events must be defined as deviations from a “base case” scenario. The characteristics 
of this base case are:the injected CO2 stays within the planned reservoir formations ; CO2 never reaches the 
bounding faults, which are nevertheless assumed as sealing;no unplanned shut down of injectors during the injection 
phase. all existing wells are sealing; injection rates and quantities as per plan and used in the Eclipse simulations. It 
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is important to stress that risk analysis is a continuous and iterative process, and that more accurate information from 
appraisal, verification and monitoring can improve the knowledge of a storage site, and can therefore adjust the 
severity and likelihood defined for each risk, and can finally lead to an updated mitigation and prevention plan 
(including monitoring). The workflow for a complete risk analysis and monitoring plan is as follows :define severity 
(i.e. impact) levels for each stake (health, financial, safety, and environment), according to the risk matrix of the 
organization; define likelihood (i.e. probability) levels; identify all project risks associated with performance 
reduction. The key performance indicators are injectivity, capacity and containment Evaluate their likelihood and 
severity; place them in the Risk Matrix to identify scenario (hazard – event – consequence) with the highest criticity; 
prepare mitigation plans to reduce likelihood and prevention plans to reduce severity to such levels that all the 
residual risks are within the acceptable levels for the organization (including local/ international regulations etc.) 
 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1.Objective and assumptions 
1.1 Objectives 
 
The objectives of this task are: 
 
x To identify the major technical hazards associated with the Romanian CCS demo project using zone 1 or 5 
(as defined in GeoEcoMar’s “Sites selection report”) as a storage site. 
x To identify the possible consequences of undesired events resulting from the combination of these hazards 
with the injection of CO2 in the subsurface. 
x To propose prevention and mitigation measures to be put in place in order to decrease the criticity of the 
risks associated with these undesired events. 
1.2 Assumptions 
 
The present report covers the identification of the technical hazards associated with the two potential candidate sites. 
 
Other types of hazards, related to legislation, permitting, conflict of interest, financing, public acceptance, 
communication and project management have not been reviewed in this study and are assumed to be covered by 
GeoEcoMar . 
 
Prevention measures, including the use of monitoring technologies are proposed in this report, but the analysis of the 
applicability of these technologies to the two candidate sites has been kept separate. . 
At this early stage of the project, only a preliminary risk assessment is possible, with the following consequences:  
 
x No risk scenario has been explicitly described, but only individual hazards (which will form the “building 
pieces” of risk scenarios);  
x No quantitative evaluation of severity and likelihood has been made;  
x Each of the two candidate zones has specific risk factors. However, given the current level of 
understanding, it has been decided that a meaningful discrimination between the two zones was not yet 
possible and therefore, the exercise has been kept as common for both zone 1 and zone 5. 
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Hazards and undesired events must be defined as deviations from a “base case” scenario. The characteristics of this 
base case are listed below: 
 
x The injected CO2 stays within the planned reservoir formations (Sa5 and Sa7 for zone 1 and Sa3, Sa4, Sa5a 
and Sa5 for zone 5) 
x CO2 never reaches the bounding faults, which are nevertheless assumed as sealing 
x No unplanned shut down of injectors during the injection phase. 
x All existing wells are sealing 
x Injection rates and quantities as per plan and used in the Eclipse simulations. 
2. Definitions and methodology 
2.1 Definitions 
 
Hazard: any object, product, physical condition or effect that has the potential to cause an undesired event. In this 
document we focus on technical hazards. 
Undesired event: event caused by the combination of a hazard and an activity (in our case, the injection of CO2 in 
the subsurface) having a negative impact on the site performance factors and subsequently on the project stakes 
(health, financial, safety, reputation, environment…). 
Risk: defined as a measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired event and the potential severity of the 
consequences. 
Risk criticity: is defined as the position of a given risk along an axis with a range from “negligible” to “non 
acceptable”. This “graduations” of this axis need to be specifically defined for the project, in relation with the 
likelihood and severity matrixes.   
Prevention measure: measure aiming at reducing the likelihood of an undesired event (through a specific hazard). 
Mitigation measure: measure aiming at reducing the severity of a consequence. 
Element: for the purpose of this exercise, the subsurface at the storage sites has been divided into simple functional 
elements for an easier classification of hazards. They are: reservoir, caprock, faults, wells, overburden, 
underburden.Storage complex: according to the EU definition, it is “the storage site and the surrounding geological 
domain which can have an effect on overall storage integrity and security; that is, secondary containment 
formations”. At this stage of the project, no secondary seal has been identified yet and we will therefore consider the 
reservoir formations (as listed in 1.3) in combination with the expected primary caprocks (Sarmatian above Sa7 for 
zone 1 and Sarmatian above Sa5 for zone 5) as storage complex for each of the two zones (the lateral boundaries of 
the complex will need further work to be defined). This definition can be easily modified if/when a secondary 
caprock is identified and doesn’t impact the relevance of the present exercise.  
Storage site: according to the EU definition, it is “a defined volume area within a geological formation used for the 
geological storage of CO2 and associated surface and injection facilities.” 
 
Leakage: according to the EU definition, it consists in “any release of CO2 from the storage complex” 
2.2 Methodology 
 
The workflow for a complete risk analysis and monitoring plan is as follows (Error! Reference source not found.): 
 
1. Define severity (i.e. impact) levels for each stake (health, financial, safety, and environment), 
according to the risk matrix of the organization. 
2. Define likelihood (i.e. probability) levels.  
3. Identify all project risks associated with performance reduction. The key performance indicators are 
injectivity, capacity and containment (any loss of performance may impact the stakes listed in 1.). 
4. Evaluate their likelihood and severity. 
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5. Place them in the Risk Matrix to identify scenario (hazard – event – consequence) with the highest 
criticity. 
6. Prepare mitigation plans to reduce likelihood and prevention plans to reduce severity to such levels 
that all the residual risks are within the acceptable levels for the organization (including local/ 
international regulations etc.)  
7. Review periodically as new information arrives  
 
                         
Fig. 1. General methodology for risk analysis 
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Fig.3 Residual risk matrix 
 
It is important to stress that risk analysis is a continuous and iterative process, and that more accurate information 
from appraisal, verification and monitoring can improve the knowledge of a storage site, and can therefore adjust the 
severity and likelihood defined for each risk, and can finally lead to an updated mitigation and prevention plan 
(including monitoring).Considering the availability of data and information available at this stage, and as stated 
above, only a preliminary risk assessment has been performed as part of this task, partly addressing steps 3 and 6 of 
the methodology described above and following the steps listed below: 
x Division of the subsurface at the storage sites into functional elements. 
x Identification of the main hazards for each element. 
x For each of these hazards, identify the associated detectable (through monitoring) undesired event(s) that 
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x Identify the potential direct and indirect consequences of these undesired events. 
x Identify prevention and mitigation measures that could be put in place to reduce the likelyhood and severity 
of the risks identified. 
This exercise has been performed by conducting a workshop with the contribution of all subsurface team members 
involved in the project. 
3. Study results 
3.1 Hazards identification table 
 
Hazards have been referenced by the functional element to which they are associated: Reservoir, Caprock, Faults, 
CO2, Overburden, Underburden, and Wells. 
 
They have been classified according to the detectable undesired event that they could potentially lead to, in the 
context of CO2 injection in the subsurface. When a hazard can lead to several events, it has been repeated in the 
relevant sections of the table. 
 
A high level review of the potential consequences of each undesired event is provided in the column 
“Consequences”. It is understood that the consequences of the same event could be different, depending on the 
hazard which is causing this event. Nonetheless, as this is a preliminary exercise this fact has not been formally 
represented in the table. 
 
Finally, a high level screening of the potential prevention measures that could be put in place at different phases of 
the project (appraisal, construction, injection/monitoring) as well as mitigation measures are provided in the last 
column of the table. 
 
This clasification is not meant to be exhaustive but its objective is rather to highlight the most important technical 
risks associated to the project and plan accordingly for the next phases (in particular the appraisal). 
3.2 Preliminary criticity analysis 
 
As mentioned before, due to the early stage of the project, a quantitative assessment of the risks has not been 
performed as part of this task. However, a preliminary analysis of the criticity of the risks associated with the 
identified hazards was conducted with the objective to highlight what were felt as the major concerns concerning the 
two candidate sites at this stage of the project. 
Again, the data currently available not allowing us to discriminate meaningfully between the two zones, this has 
been kept as a common exercise. 
The most critical hazards identified are presented in Table 1 below: 
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Table 1: Hazards with high perceived criticity 
 
* This looks to be more of an issue for zone 5 where the bounding faults are seen on existing 2D lines to extend 
higher than the top of caprock 
 
It can be seen that most of these hazards are associated to concerns about the containment of the future storage site. 
It can also be noted that the presence of most of these hazards in this list is due to the current lack of data available 
to the project and that thorough appraisal campaigns should be able to remove most of the uncertainty associated to 
these concerns. 
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Element Hazard Main Performance Factor impacted 
Reservoir Insufficient lateral extent of pinch outs Containment 
Caprock  Unidentified conductive faults crossing caprock  Containment 
Caprock  Unidentified fracture corridors crossing caprock  Containment 
Caprock  Permeability underestimated  Containment 
Wells  Existing P&A wells leaking  Containment 
Faults  Unidentified faults within the reservoir not laterally transmissive Capacity, Injectivity 
Faults  Bounding fault not sealing vertically* or laterally Containment 
Reservoir  Permeability lower than expected Injectivity 
Reservoir  Porosity lower than expected  Capacity 
Reservoir  Plugging due to salting out around well  Injectivity 
